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I. INTRODUCTION
Governments often impose trade-related investment measures
(TRIMs) upon foreign investors in local manufacturing ventures in order
to achieve their national economic objectives. These investment meas-
ures take a variety of forms, the most common of which are local content
requirements and minimum export levels. These measures aid the host
country (the country where the investor invests or locates) with its inter-
national trading endeavors to the detriment of the home country (where
the investing company originates) and other nations. Similar to other
nations, socialist countries also utilize TRIMs to accomplish economic
goals.
The use of TRIMs has been attacked, principally by the United
States, for distorting international trade.' Efforts to control TRIMs have
reached the point where they will be a major topic of discussion in the
ongoing talks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
Geneva, Switzerland. If a consensus for curtailing the use of TRIMs
exists, any agreement is almost certain to affect all countries, including
most socialist countries.
This Article first describes the problems associated with the use of
TRIMs. In doing so, it discusses exactly what TRIMs are and why cer-
tain countries, such as the United States, oppose their use. Moreover, it
describes the use of TRIMs by socialist countries.
Second, this Article describes the solutions being sought to curtail
the use of TRIMs. It describes the specific steps the United States has
taken to inhibit the use of TRIMs. Furthermore, it. briefly describes the
efforts of other international organizations that have attempted to grap-
ple with this problem.
Finally, an analysis of how the TRIMs issue will be handled in the
next round of GATT negotiations is presented. Arguably, some articles
of the GATT already address TRIMs. This Article deals with the appli-
cability of current GATT articles, as well as additional efforts to
strengthen GATT coverage of TRIMs. A discussion of how any resolu-
tion of the TRIM conflict might affect socialist countries concludes this
Article.
1. The U.S. Congress, however, has also considered the use of TRIMs, including legisla.
tion that would require a minimum percentage of locally manufactured parts in automobiles
assembled in the U.S. by foreign-owned automobile makers. In the last session of Congress,
interests in the automobile industry supported the introduction of H.R. 1350, which would
have introduced local content rules. The U.S. automobile industry is likely to push for similar
legislation in the future.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF TRIMS
A. Description of TRIMs
Governments of host countries often impose performance require-
ments to ensure that foreign investors act in accordance with the objec-
tives of the host country and to promote the general welfare of the host
country. In short, host countries often seek to control the behavior of
multinational corporations and foreign investors in a manner most
favorable to the host country.2 TRIMs are those performance require-
ments that the host countries have designed to promote these trade pol-
icy objectives.3
What forms do TRIMs take? The most common TRIMs are the
following:
Local content requirements, which require the foreign investor to
procure locally produced goods and services as a minimum percentage of
the final product's value, or to establish certain related manufacturing
operations in the host country; and
Export requirements, which obligate the investor to export either: (a)
a specified minimum amount of the total goods produced; (b) a certain
absolute number of the total produced; (c) a quantity that sufficiently
offsets the import purchases of the foreign investor; or (d) an amount
that covers expenditures of foreign exchange.
Other restrictions on foreign investors, while technically not trade-
related, can also be imposed, such as the following:
Technology transfer requirements, which require the technology in-
volved to be licensed to citizens of the host country or stipulate the intro-
duction of certain types of technology into the host country;
Local equity participation obligations, which impose a minimum eq-
uity position to be held by nationals of the host country in the investment
project; and
Employment, size, location, and financing requirements, which spec-
ify the use of local labor and management, the actual size of the en-
deavor, the location of the project or projects (often in depressed areas of
2. T. Moran & C. Pearson, Trade Related Investment Performance Requirements 13
(Mar. 1987) (study prepared for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Washington,
D.C.).
3. TRIMs have other names. For instance, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
has used the term "Trade-Related Performance Requirements." We have chosen to use the
term "TRIM" since this label is being used in the new GATT round. The primary difference
between TRIMs and other names is that TRIMs may include investment incentives. See id. at
7; Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade-Related Performance Requirements Under the GT47T-MTN
System and US. Law, 14 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 129, 130 (1982).
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the host country), and strict rules regarding the ability to obtain local
financing.4
At first glance, these requirements appear to present considerable
burdens for the foreign investor and one may wonder why foreign inves-
tors proceed under these conditions. For instance, a minimum require-
ment to export can substantially reduce a firm's profitability because the
firm might be able to sell its product domestically at a higher price. A
limitation on domestic sales may hinder the foreign investor's ability to
compete with local competitors. Moreover, an investor might balk at
having to purchase inputs for the final product at more expensive local
prices. Worse yet, an investor may fear being placed at the mercy of an
unreliable local supplier. Finally, a foreign investor might be reluctant to
accept terms that dictate where to locate a plant, how large it can be, and
whom he is required to employ. In fact, foreign investors might con-
clude, as one study has, that TRIMs impair the ability of management to
control its own operations to a prohibitive extent.5
However, foreign investors generally submit to TRIMs because of
other specific inducements provided by the host country. These attrac-
tions can include the following:
Direct subsidies or tax incentives, which raise the firm's profitability
in relation to the profits the firm would make if it were subject solely to
market forces (including the proiision of government-subsidized inputs,
often in the form of cheap raw materials or cheap capital);
Export subsidies, which reduce the cost of exporting the required
level of exports to a reasonable level;
A protected market, which compensates a foreign investor for higher
input costs by sheltering its final product from competition; and
Subsidized training of local labor, prohibitions against strikes, and
preferred access to local credit, all of which induce a foreign investor to
locate in the host country.6
Thus, these inducements often suffice to overcome the burdensome
requirements of the TRIMs.
B. Extensiveness of TRIMs
In the United States, the government agency primarily responsible
4. Bale & Walters, Investment Policy Aspects of U.S. and Global Trade Interests, 9 LooK-
ING AHEAD 1, 6 (1986); Bergsten, Coming Investment Wars?, 53 FORMON AFi. 135, 135-42
(1974).
5. See Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 6-7; T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at 21.
.6. See Bergsten, supra note 4, at 143.
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for international trade policy, the Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR), monitors the use of TRIMs by other countries. It
has determined that the use of TRIMs is fairly widespread. Of the sev-
enty-six countries examined, fifty-two of them (thirteen developed and
thirty-nine developing) use at least one TRIM instrument.' American
companies invest heavily in these countries. United States foreign direct
investment in countries using TRIMs amounted to more than S150 bil-
lion in 1981 and represented sixty-eight percent of all United States for-
eign direct investment for that year.8
Because of the difficulty in obtaining information about TRIMs, es-
timates of the extensiveness of TRIMs vary considerably. Developing
countries in particular utilize TRIMs. One study surveying one hundred
American, Canadian, and European companies with substantial foreign
investment found that advanced developing countries such as Brazil and
India often imposed local content requirements on those investors.9 De-
veloping countries frequently restrict investment in certain economic sec-
tors (such as banking), curb the extent of foreign ownership in an
enterprise, and limit repatriation of profits.10
Socialist countries also employ TRIMs. They often use trade bal-
ancing policies that require an equivalent amount of exports for a certain
amount of imports.11 In addition, socialist countries levy controls on eq-
uity investments and place restrictions on the ability of a foreign investor
to repatriate profits. 2 The practice by some socialist countries of requir-
ing foreign investors to take products in kind in certain transactions
might also constitute the use of TRIMs. Finally, socialist countries, as
well as market economy countries, often place limitations on equity par-
ticipation by foreign investors.1 3
The extensiveness of the use of TRIMs varies greatly with the type
of industry involved. The industries most frequently targeted for the ap-
plication of TRIMs are the automobile, mining, electrical machinery,
7. Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 7.
8. Ia at 6-7.
9. Id at 7.
10. Id
11. See Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 135-36.
12. A 1985 U.S. Department of Commerce study concluded that Poland employs certain
types of TRIMs. The screening of foreign investment is considered by some to be a TRIM
since it conceivably affects trade flows. Moreover, Poland places controls on the repatriation
of profits and this practice would definitely come under scrutiny as a TRIM. Jadach, Owner-
ship and Investment in Poland, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 65-66, 79, 87-93 (1985). Se. eg..
Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe, Problems and Prospects of Romania's
Joint Venture Legislation, 6 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1059, 1084-86 (1974).
13. See Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 6.
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and equipment sectors.' 4 In particular, the automobile industry is the
source of expansive TRIM protection.' Nevertheless, many automobile
companies have opened foreign plants despite the existence of TRIMs
because of the difficulty in entering those foreign markets simply by ex-
porting automobiles to them.16 In the mining sector, many developing
countries possessing raw materials have attempted to capture more of the
production process by imposing domestic processing requirements. For
example, some petroleum exporting nations have required that refine-
ment of their oil take place in those countries.17
C. Why the United States and Other Countries Oppose
the Use of TRIMs
The use of TRIMs has been justified on economic and political
grounds. It has also been vehemently attacked on those very same
grounds. This Article discusses this conflict in order to provide insight
into the struggle that will take place in the GATT talks.
1. Economic Grounds
From a conventional economic analysis, TRIMs distort the flow of
international trade. Countries using TRIMs achieve welfare gains at the
expense of other countries. These actions are commonly known as "beg-
gar-thy-neighbor" policies.'
TRIMs often cause companies to pursue practices that they would
not consider in the open market. For instance, local content require-
ments require an investor to acquire its raw materials or parts locally
rather than from a supplier offering the highest quality and the lowest
price.' 9 In other words, in an open market the investing company would
choose its locations based on where it could operate most efficiently and
where it could purchase components on the most advantageous terms.
Local producers that sell to foreign investors are generally not the most
efficient manufacturers of the components.20 Consequently, if a host
country uses TRIMs, the investor may be forced to maintain inefficient
production facilities locally even though more efficient manufacturing fa-
14. Id. at 7-8.
15. Id. at 8. See OFFICE OF INT'L INVESTMENT, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, THE USE OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
By FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 9-10 (1981).
16. See Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 8.
17. Id.; T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at 45.
18. R. CAVES & A. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 262 (2d ed. 1977).
19. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 134-35.
20. Id. at 135.
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cilities could be located elsewhere.21
Export performance requirements can also require the foreign inves-
tor to relocate plants in the host country. Even if the relocations prove
inefficient, a company may nevertheless take this action in order to meet
the agreed quota for export. This may be the case even though the same
company could produce the products more cheaply in another country. 22
Consequently, as is the case with local content requirements, productive
resources are misallocated when export requirements are adopted.
Moreover, export performance requirements may place great pressure
upon a producer to "dump" his product overseas in order to comply with
strict host country export quotas, thereby causing harm to more efficient
producers.23 Thus, these practices often cause jobs and plants to be
shifted to other countries that do not produce these goods as efficiently.24
Despite these undesirable effects, proponents advance several ra-
tionales to justify TRIMs. Each has been criticized. First, TRIMs have
been justified as a means to establish and protect infant industries. It is
argued that once established, the industry will be able to compete effec-
tively.25 Thus, the trade distortion caused by TRIMs exists only tempo-
rarily. However, one can argue that a national government should not be
placed in the position of deciding which industries will flourish. There
have been notable failures in this area, such as the failed attempts by
agrarian countries to establish heavy industries.26 Moreover, this process
requires the host government to tamper with free market allocation of
resources.
27
Second, some justify TRIMs on the grounds that they act as tools
for preventing pricing abuses.28 Pricing between the foreign investor's
local plant and its parent can be at inflated transfer prices. Arguably, the
imposition of local content requirements could curtail the dangers of this
pricing abuse. This argument has been criticized, however, because
TRIMs do not squarely address this abuse. Direct regulation of transfer
pricing would allow the host country to control pricing abuses without
21. Id. at 134-35.
22. Id.
23. Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 8; Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 136. Dump-
ing occurs when a producer sells his product overseas at a lesser price than he charges in his
home country.
24. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 134-35; Davidson, Matusz & Kreinin, Analysis
of Performance Standards for Direct Foreign Investments, 18 CAN. J. ECON. 876 (1985).
25. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 136.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 137.
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creating TRIM-induced economic distortions. 29
Third, some justify the use of TRIMs to accelerate the transfer of
technology." Countries often require foreign investors to use the latest
valuable technology in the production of certain products. Moreover,
foreign investors presumably assist local manufacturers by providing
quality components, thereby raising production standards within the
country. Critics argue that TRIMs can have the opposite effect by
retarding technological progress.3 Often, the foreign investor is a cap-
tive customer, forced to purchase components locally. Consequently, the
local manufacturers have no fear that the foreign investor will take his
business elsewhere, and thus lack the incentive to employ sophisticated,
and more efficient, technology.
Fourth, some proponents argue that once certain technologies are
introduced, a host country may possess a comparative advantage in the
production of a certain product. a2 The technology transfer simply helps
that host country to realize a "latent" comparative advantage.33 Critics
respond that the same arguments that applied to the infant industry also
apply here. Host governments are given the untenable task of deciding
which industries should possess such an advantage.34
Fifth, the need to eliminate a balance of payments deficit has been
proposed to justify the use of TRIMs. Critics of TRIMs argue that, ac-
cording to conventional economics, deflationary monetary or fiscal poli-
cies, or even exchange rate depreciations, are better alternatives because
they achieve the same result without distorting international trade.3
Finally, developing countries have voiced the need to concentrate
their economic policy efforts in increasing export capacity and selling
more products abroad as a means of servicing their huge debts to West-
ern creditors. They contend TRIMs are a necessary tool to achieve these
goals. Contrary to this philosophy runs the belief that a country's naked
pursuit of trade imbalances with its trading partners.-particularly by use
of TRIMs-not only distorts international trade, but results in interna-
tional tensions, which can lead to retaliation and a resurgence of protec-
tionism in world markets.
29. T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at 21.
30. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 137.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 138.
33. The introduction of certain technologies permits countries to take full advantage of
their comparatively favorable attributes.
34. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 137-38.
35. Id.; R. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 48 (1970);
Bergsten, supra note 4, at 145.
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The United States, among other countries, is steadfast in its criti-
cism of TRIMs, considering any use to be a negative phenomenon. It
believes that TRIMs generally place the various actors in the interna-
tional economic system in a worse position than they would be in with-
out the use of TRIMs. The United States repeatedly argues that
nondistorting policy tools are preferable. 6
2. Political Issues
Similarly, strong political arguments have been asserted both for
and against TRIMs. First, countries that use TRIMs argue that they are
an invaluable tool for achieving national economic aims. TRIMs provide
governments with the tools to control foreign investors. More particu-
larly, they contend that host governments can require multinational cor-
porations to promote the host's national economic and welfare goals.
Critics attack this argument on the ground that it runs counter to the
idea of free trade. The relinquishment of some aspects of sovereignty
must be accepted if the more important goal of international free trade is
to flourish. Critics point to the practices that have been banned under
the GATT as evidence of this aim.37
Second, many less developed countries have argued that they re-
quire TRIMs in order to redirect more benefits of the world trading sys-
tem to themselves. Without TRIMs, foreign investors simply use
developing countries as convenient markets for their products. At best,
developing countries could expect only to receive assembly plants, with-
out gaining any of the benefits associated with the transfer of technology
or superior production processes. Thus, they argue that TRIMs transfer
to developing countries skills and jobs that would otherwise remain in
developed nations. Opponents of TRIMs often dismiss this argument on
the grounds that TRIMs are not only an improper way to accomplish
accumulation of technology and skills, but that they retard a country's
development. TRIMs trap a developing country into reliance on a host
of trade restrictions that undermine development. Critics contend that
reliance on trade restrictions eventually undermines development. In ad-
dition, they deem TRIMs unsatisfactory because they have a net welfare
36. Note, however, that the U.S. imposes certain restraints on its own foreign investors.
For example, foreigners are prohibited from owning more than 20% of radio or television
broadcasting companies and, as the much-publicized and ill-fated attempt by Fujitsu to
purchase Fairchild demonstrates, foreign investors are not welcome to purchase certain de-
fense-related businesses. See Japanese Purchase of Chip Maker Cancelled After Objections in
U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
37. See T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at 13; Salacuse, Towards a New Treaty
Framework for Direct Foreign Investment, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 969, 977 (1985).
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cost to the international community at large. Finally, they have found
that TRIMs primarily benefit the more prosperous of the developing
countries. The poorer developing countries are generally not in the same
position as the relatively advanced developing countries to make de-
mands on foreign investors.3
In sum, the political arguments made against TRIMs are those often
used for the promotion of free trade. The free flow of commerce pro-
motes economic interdependence and theoretically strengthens political
stability for all countries involved.
3. International Tensions
The short-term burden from the use of TRIMs falls squarely on the
home countries where production facilities of the foreign investors are
originally based. When a host country receives an increasing share of the
benefits brought by a foreign investor, it generally does so at the cost of
the home country of the foreign investor.39 These practices remove eco-
nomic activity and jobs from home countries, such as in the United
States, without the traditional economic justification and in violation of
free trade principles.40
Not surprisingly, because of the competing national interests in-
volved, the TRIM issue has become a touchy one for the United States.
As a major foreign investor, the United States has become disgruntled
because of the resulting loss of economic benefits due to TRIMs.4' For
this reason, the United States has sought to raise the issue in many differ-
ent international forums. Discussed next are the prior United States ef-
forts to address the TRIM conflict, focusing particularly on efforts in the
GATT. A discussion of how these developments might affect the social-
ist countries that are party to the GATT concludes this Article.
III. ATTEMPTS TO REDRESS TRIMs
A. Attempts to Regulate TRIMs Under the GAIT
1. The Nature of the GATT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade42 is a multilateral
38. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 141-42. See also Grossman, The Theory of
Domestic Content Protection and Content, 96 Q.J. EcON., Nov. 1981, at 583 (discussing unde-
sirable economic results from the use of certain types of TRIMs).
39. Bergsten, supra note 4, at 148.
40. T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at 55.
41. See Bergsten, supra note 4, at 150.
42. Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 V.N.T.S. 187,
[Vol. I I
Trade Related Investment Measures
agreement that was concluded after World War II. Its purposes are to
promote stability and encourage growth through international com-
merce.43 The pillars of reciprocity and nondiscrimination serve as the
basis of the GATT. Reciprocity under the GATT requires an exchange
of concessions during commercial negotiations. These commercial nego-
tiations take the form of multilateral negotiations, called rounds,
whereby countries meet to lower trade tariffs and to attempt to limit or
eliminate trade restrictions.44
Nondiscrimination is the central tenet of the GATT. It requires
that all GATT members unconditionally extend Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) status to all members.45 Consequently, benefits conceded to one
member in the rounds generally must be conceded to the other parties of
the GAIT. Exceptions to this principle exist in the form of countenanc-
ing customs unions and granting certain benefits to developing countries
under the Generalized System of Preferences, among other things."
Nonetheless, nondiscrimination is still central to the workings of the
GATT.
Certain parties have asserted that the GATT already covers the is-
sue of TRIMs. For instance, TRIMs have been challenged for providing
protection beyond that accorded in a particular country's tariff sched-
ule.4 7 This protection arguably violates article II, paragraph 1 of the
GATT, which stipulates that imports shall not receive less favorable
treatment than that accorded in each GAIT member's tariff schedule.
Moreover, article III conceivably bans local content requirements.
Article III provides that imported goods should be taxed and regulated
in the same fashion as goods produced in the home market.48 Essen-
tially, this article prohibits the sort of discrimination inherent in local
content requirements. In fact, the United States charged Canada with
violating this article in the procedures established in the Canadian For-
eign Investment Review Act (FIRA).4 9 Generally, the FIRA provided
43. Lansing & Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Fawvred-Nation Status for
Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L LJ. 329, 334-35
(1984).
44. Id. at 355.
45. See i. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 76-80 (1969).
46. Lansing & Rose, supra note 43, at 336.
47. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 144.
48. See id. at 146.
49. Foreign Investment Review Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 46 (1973-1974). See Albrecht,
Canadian Foreign Investment Policy and the International Politico-Legal Process, 1983 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 149; Carasco, The Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAYTT): Incompatible?, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 441
(1983).
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that all foreign investment, including local sourcing, had to be approved
and, in certain situations, regulated by the Canadian Government, In
February 1984, a GATT Panel of Experts held that certain local content
requirements were illegal in this case.50
Finally, article XVI, paragraph 4 of the GATI' theoretically prohib-
its the use of investment incentives or other subsidies linked to perform-
ance requirements on nonprimary products resulting in the sale of those
products for export at a price lower than that in the domestic market,
Nonetheless, attempts to have these articles applied to TRIMs have been
resisted. In fact, one trade official at the United States Department of
Commerce asserted that the United States felt it imperative to discuss
TRIMs specifically because of a widespread belief that the GATT does
not actually cover most TRIMs.5'
2. Efforts to Treat TRIMs Directly Under the GATT
In the late 1950s the GATT unsuccessfully attempted to take a more
active role in curbing restrictive business practices. For two decades af-
ter this initial foray, the GATT organization paid little attention to the
issue. By the middle 1970s there was a resurgence of interest in this area.
However, that interest focused particularly on government-sanctioned
recession cartels.52
The Tokyo Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, completed
in 1979, broadened the GATT agenda beyond simply reducing import
tariff barriers. A major effort was made to negotiate limitations to and
reductions of nontariff measures distorting global trade. These nontariff
barriers had become more prevalent with the reduction of import tariff
barriers. In the Tokyo Round, agreements were reached in the areas of
subsidies, dumping, government procurement, technical standards, and
licensing. 3 The Tokyo Round effectively established the ability of the
GATT to expand and cover issues other than tariff reductions.
In the November 1982 GATT ministerial meeting, the United States
lobbied for an initiative to cover TRIMs. This effort failed largely be-
cause the international community lacked a consensus on investment
matters sufficient to permit the discussion of a regime to regulate invest-
ment issues. Apparently, the developing countries as a bloc, and many
developed countries, still wanted to retain their ability to discriminate
50. See Davidson, Matusz & Kreinin, supra note 24, at 877.
51. See 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096-97 (Sept. 9, 1986).
52. Brewer, International Regulation of Restrictive Busine.r Practices, 16 J, WOItLD
TRADE L. 108, 115 (1982).
53. Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 13.
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against foreign investments.54
The United States has actively promoted the inclusion of TRIMs in
the round of trade negotiations for some time. 55 In April 1986 the
United States gained the agreement of the world's main industrialized
countries that the negotiations for the new GATT round would include
TRIMs, among other subjects. 6 In June of that year, the European
Community stated publicly that it would follow the United States' lead
on the agenda for the new round of trade talks." In Uruguay in Septem-
ber 1986, the United States was finally able to include TRIMs as a topic
for the upcoming GAfT round in the ministerial meeting. United States
Trade Ambassador Clayton Yeutter stated that it has been extremely dif-
ficult to win the inclusion of TRIMs on the agenda.58 Most of the Latin
American countries banded together to oppose this development. None-
theless, the agenda included this topic.59
Most recently, the GATT established the negotiating plans for its
working group on TRIMs. The Investment Subgroup, chaired by Japan,
is busily identifying which TRIMs will be included in the GATT talks.
Several types of TRIMs are under consideration, including local content
requirements, export requirements, requirements linked to technology
transfer, equity restrictions, manufacturing requirements, and investment
incentives. °
The Subgroup is also identifying which articles under the GATT
can be revised to better tackle the trade problems raised by TRIMs.61 As
of now, the articles identified for further discussion include article III
(treatment of foreign-controlled enterprises), article VI (subsidies), and
article XVII (state trading enterprises).
Negotiations in this area will most likely remain an uphill battle.
The United States remains strongly committed to including TRIMs in
the GATT negotiations because this multilateral forum presents the best
chance for resolving these issues. United States officials are currently
54. Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for US. Export-
ers of Goods, Services and Capital, 14 LAw & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 569, 593 n.109 (1982).
55. Trade Aides Fail to Narrow Differences Prior to the New Round of GATT Talks, Wall
St. J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 30, col. 1.
56. OECD Ministers Agree on Comprehensive Agenda for New Round of GA7T Talks, 3
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 532 (Apr. 23, 1986).
57. E.C Will Support U.S. Agenda Suggestions For Upcoming GA7T Round, De Clercq
Says, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 735-36 (June 4, 1986).
58. Decision to Launch New GA7TRound is Victory for U.S., USTR Yeutter Tells Ways
and Means, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1182-83 (Oct. 1, 1986).
59. Id
60. WASH. INT'L Bus. REP., May 1987, at 4.
61. Id.
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encouraging the European Community and Japan to remain steadfast in
their support of this initiative. United States officials fear that without
this support the United States will appear isolated and the developing
countries will refuse to make any concessions during the talks. 62
B. Attempts to Limit TRIMs by Means Other than the GATT
Apart from the GATT efforts, the United States has attempted to
limit the use of TRIMs in many ways. First, the United States has tried
to attack the problem by means of its trade laws, particularly section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974.63 Under section 301, the President may take
action against countries that are deemed to be unfairly discriminating
against United States exporters or United States exports. The President
may act under section 301 either on his own initiative or in response to a
petition filed by a private party. Section 301 is a flexible statute designed
to address any discriminatory practice against United States exports of
goods, services, and capital. Section 301 actions have been used to ad-
dress a wide scope of unfair practices ranging from discriminatory gov-
ernment procurement and the conferral of improper domestic subsidies
to discriminatory laws effectively excluding United States exports and
services. When all else fails, the President usually imposes prohibitively
high tariffs on designated products from the offending country to cover
estimated damages.'
A sound case could be made that TRIMs violate United States
rights under this law.65 However, section 301 apparently has never yet
been used directly to redress the use of TRIMs.66 The reason for this lies
in the fact that once an American investor has decided to invest in a
foreign country, there is little, if any, incentive to challenge the TRIMs.
Host countries would deeply resent a section 301 action and the Ameri-
can company would likely face retaliation in some form.67 Moreover,
most American companies when deciding to invest in the country in
question have already considered and accepted the trade restrictions as a
cost of doing business.
Nonetheless, Congress amended section 301 in the Trade and Tariff
62. Id.
63. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. IIi 1985).
64. See Caplan & Graubart, An Exporter's Guide To US Trade Laws, EXPORT TODAY,
Fall 1986, at 9, 12-13.
65. Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 3, at 164-66.
66. T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at 59.
67. Id.
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Act of 1984 to better address the use of TRIMs. 68 In fact, the United
States is involved in a section 301 case involving Brazil on the subject of
informatics.69 This case apparently has some TRIM-related aspects that
are being considered under section 301. In particular, the United States
has alleged that Brazil has placed restrictions on the types of investments
United States companies can make in the Brazilian informatics industry.
In addition, the United States and Brazil have been actively discussing
United States allegations that Brazil has been imposing domestic content
and export performance requirements on United States companies doing
business in Brazil.70
Second, Congress created section 307 in the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984.71 This trade law specifically addresses the use of export perform-
ance requirements by other countries. The USTR is empowered to nego-
tiate with countries using export performance requirements that
adversely affect United States economic concerns. The USTR can then
impose import restrictions against the country involved if negotiations
prove unsuccessful.72 In fact, the United States negotiated with Taiwan
for the removal of TRIMs in its automotive sector pursuant to this trade
law. The United States brought an action on March 31, 1986, after
Toyota was granted the right to build a manufacturing plant in that
country subject to export requirements. In September 1986 Taiwan
agreed to cease any future export performance requirements in this sec-
tor, and the United States terminated its investigation.73
Third, the United States countervailing duty laws could indirectly
address TRIMs. 4 Countervailing duties usually are used to address ille-
gal subsidies conferred by foreign governments. A United States corpo-
ration usually will prevail in a countervailing duty case when it can
demonstrate that a foreign nation is providing an illegal subsidies in
either the production or export of a product into the United States. Typi-
cal government practices that are considered to confer subsidies include
government grants, tax incentives, export rebates, or an assumption of
68. See Caplan & Graubert, supra note 64, at 12; T. Moran & C. Pearson, supra note 2, at
58.
69. Brazil Informatics Section 301 Case, 52 Fed. Reg. 4207 (1987).
70. Telephone interview with Larry Farris, Brazilian Desk Officer, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce (Feb. 1, 1988).
71. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112-2114 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72. Id.
73. US., Taiwan Reach Agreement on Customs, Valuation Policy; Retaliation Threat
Dropped, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1027 (Aug. 13, 1986).
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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distribution of the product."5 Theoretically, goods that are imported into
the United States that are produced in facilities receiving subsidies are
subject to the countervailing duty laws if those goods cause or threaten to
cause injury to a domestic United States industry.' 6 The countervailing
duty laws could be used to address TRIM methods adopted by the host
country where those measures confer a subsidy.
Fourth, the United States has attempted to take TRIMs into ac-
count when determining which countries can qualify products for the
United States program of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).77
The GSP program permits less-developed countries to export certain
qualified goods to the United States duty-free. The United States
adopted this program in 1976 as part of an overall effort by developed
countries to improve trade opportunities for developing nations.78 Con-
gress amended the GSP law in 1984 to permit the United States to take
into account TRIMs in deciding whether to confer valuable GSP bene-
fits. Thus, if the United States chooses, it can apply direct pressure on
those countries using TRIMs.
The United States has also participated in an effort to limit the use
of TRIMs through various multilateral forums. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an organization com-
posed mainly of the United States and its Western European allies, has a
Committee on Restrictive Business Practices that has examined various
forms of TRIMs. Much of OECD's effort, though, has been directed
toward national competition laws, the behavior of multinational corpora-
tions, and government-sanctioned cartels.79
In the United Nations system, attempts have been made to address
restrictive investment practices. For over a decade, the United Nations
Commission on Transnational Corporations has been trying to develop a
code of conduct on restrictive business practices.80 However, the formu-
lation of this code has been slow and little progress is expected for the
near future. This Commission is considering rules to deal with TRIMs,
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1983). See Caplan & Graubert, supra note 64, at 11.
76. Caplan & Graubert, supra note 64, at 11.
77. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (Supp. III 1985).
78. Meltzer, The U.S. Renewal of the G.S.P. Complications fir North.South Trade, 20 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 507, 509 (1986).
79. Brewer, supra note 52, at 113-15.
80. See U.N. ESCOR COMM'N ON TRANSNAT'L CORPORATIONS, WORK ON THE FOR-
MULATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/S/2 (1985); U.N. ESCOR COMM'N ON TRANSNAT'L
CORPORATIONS, COMPLETION OF THE FORMULATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF
CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/S/5 (1985),
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but the gist of its effort is focused on direct investment issues. Other
agencies in the United Nations, notably the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), have also been involved in
this area.81 UNIDO, in particular, has been involved in the examination
of transfer of technology issues. Nonetheless, one United States trade
official noted that the real effort for the regulation of these measures is
taking place under the rubric of the GATT, and these organizations are
not expected to contribute significantly to the debate.82
The World Bank has also considered the idea of an investment code
or treaty that would unlock export opportunities.83 The efforts under
this international organization have not been very active recently,
however.
There have also been calls for the conclusion of a multilateral agree-
ment that would govern investment issues in much the same way that the
GATT handles international trade issues." This effort has been met
with much resistance, especially on the part of the developing countries.
Thus, it is not surprising that the United States and others have pushed
for the inclusion of investment issues under the framework of an existing
multilateral treaty, namely, the GATT.
IV. THE EFFECT OF ANY TRIM DEVELOPMENTS ON
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
Currently, six socialist countries are members of the GATT: Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary.85 Some
members, such as Cuba, are not fully participating members. Other so-
cialist countries, such as Bulgaria, act as official observers of the
GATT.86 Most recently, the People's Republic of China applied for
GATT membership and is expected eventually to be admitted.
8 7
81. Brewer, supra note 52, at 109-12.
82. See Bale & Walters, supra note 4, at 14.
83. Tyler, Learning to Live with Capitalism: Developing Nations and Foreign Investment,
Fin. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, at 18, col. 2 (London ed.).
84. See Salacuse, supra note 37, at 1005-10.
85. Grzybowski, Socialist Countries in GAT, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 539, 547 (1980); Bolz
& Pissulla, GATT's Role in East-West Trade, INTERECONOMICS, Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 102.
86. Grzybowski, supra note 85, at 547.
87. China Files Membership Application, Council Hears U.S. Farm Trade Charges Against
Japan, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 915 (July 16, 1986). See generally Herzstein, China and the
GAYT. Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China's Participation in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 18 LAW & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 371 (1986) (discussing the implications of
China's admittance to the GATT).
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Problems arose with the entrance of some of these socialist countries
because of an apparent conflict with some of the principal GATT provi-
sions." First, the GATT operates on the assumption that import restric-
tions are prohibited. Planned economies of socialist countries
incorporate principles theoretically in violation of this tenet. Second, ac-
cording to the MFN principle, new members of the GATT are assured
that they will be able to export goods at the prevailing rates of duty
within the GATT.8 9 Many socialist countries do not have custom duties
as understood in the GATT and, therefore, would be hard pressed to
reciprocate by reducing tariffs in any GATT negotiations."
Consequently, most socialist countries were admitted to the GATT
under special terms. For instance, Poland pledged in 1967 to increase its
imports from GATT members at an annual rate of seven percent, in or-
der to achieve an effect similar to a tariff reduction.91 Actions such as
this tend to stimulate trade and thus are in accordance with the GATT's
general aims and objectives.
These differences raise a whole host of questions in the area of
TRIMs. Socialist countries that are members of the GATT would have
to comply fully with any new developments in the TRIM area.92 The
fact that many countries, capitalist and socialist alike, use TRIMs to en-
courage national aims, justifies this proposal. In short, the differences of
the political systems do not bear any relevance to the removal or limita-
tion of TRIMs. Unofficially, there may be room for compromise. The
United States and others may agree to permit the use of TRIMs in cer-
tain situations, such as a country's shortage of hard currency.
Socialist countries might well argue that certain practices con-
demned as TRIMs are part and parcel of the socialist system.93 For in-
stance, local content requirements very well may be part of national
programs mandating the production of a certain amount or type of
goods. Moreover, certain socialist countries, such as Poland, have
claimed to be developing countries. 94 These socialist countries conceiv-
88. Bolz & Pissulla, supra note 85, at 102.
89. See Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Nonmarket Economies, 20 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 185, 186 (1986). See also Bolz & Pissulla, supra note 85, at 106.
90. Bolz & Pissulla, supra note 85, at 103-05. See Patterson, supra note 89, at 185.
91. Bolz & Pissulla, supra note 85, at 103.
92. See id. at 105.
93. See e.g., Jadach, supra note 12, at 63; Lebkowski & Monkiewicz, Western Direct In-
vestment in Centrally Planned Economies, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 624 (1986),
94. See Scriver, Joint Ventures in Poland, J. WORLD TRADE L., Sept.- Oct. 1980, at 424,
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ably could qualify for certain exceptions to any TRIM rules based on
their classification as developing nations.
At this stage, however, it is uncertain which TRIMs, if any, will be
dealt with in the GATT round. Socialist countries should expect that the
position of the United States will be that socialist countries should re-
ceive treatment similar to capitalist countries. Socialist countries, such
as Poland, should bear this in mind while preparing for the GATT
rounds.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article discussed why certain countries consider TRIMs to be
invaluable and why others consider them evil. Although the GATT
round undoubtedly will address this topic, it is still too early to predict
exactly which TRIMs will be discussed. Similarly, it would be a futile
effort to guess what remedial action might be taken to address the use of
TRIMs. Nonetheless, because of the intense nationalist emotions and
large economic stakes, TRIMs as an issue will certainly be raised again if
there is no consensus in the GATT round. Consequently, socialist and
developing countries need to prepare themselves to address this issue in
the far, if not near, future.
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